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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last twenty years, the increasing availability of computers' has
revolutionized the fundamental methods of communication. Today,
through the use of computers and the Internet,3 more people than ever
have direct access to an increasing amount of information! In addition,
the advent of complex information systems, such as the Internet, have

made direct communication between individuals more accessible,' more
rapid,6 and more powerful

But the heightened ability to communicate

1. See Loftus E.Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 203 (1989) ("In the [1980's], millions of
Americans have bought powerful home computers."); Robert Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin
Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 121,
121 & n.1 (1987) (citing an estimate made in 1982 that, by 1990, computers would appear in
up to 40 million homes (citing J. TYDEMAN Er AL., TELETEXT AND VIDEOTEXT IN THE UNITED
STATES 77 (1982))). See generally Loy A. SINGLETON, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2d ed. 1986) (discussing how the explosion of computers has changed the
structure of telecommunications).
2. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 100TH CONG., SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,

AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-12 (1987), microformedon CIS No. 87-952-59 (Congressional Info.
Serv.); Anthony J. Sassan, Note, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.: Comparing Apples to
Oranges: The Need for a New Media Classification, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 821, 822 (1992).
3. The Internet is an international network of computers connected by phone lines, fiber
optic cables, and special hardware devices designed to propagate and route communication.
HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE REFERENCE 2-3 (1994). For a brief
description and introduction to the Internet, see infra Part II.A.
4. Phillip H. Ault, Introduction to Part Three: The Technology Revolution, in
MAINCURRENTS IN MASS COMMUNICATIONS 203, 204-06 (Warren K. Agee et al. eds., 1986).
5. David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and
Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 81 (1993); see David J. Conner,
Casenote, Cubby v. CompuServe, Defamation Law on the Electronic Frontier,GEO. MASON
INDEP. L. REV., Winter 1993, at 228-31 (discussing how computer bulletin board systems (BBS)
have increased accessibility).
6. Becker, supra note 1, at 204; see Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice
in Cyberspace: Liability on the Electronic Frontier,COMPUTER LAW., July 1994, at 1; Eric
Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas:Recognizing Legal
Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 87, 107
(1993).
7. See Ault, supra note 4, at 209 (discussing how fiber optics increase the amount of
transmission that can be sent over a single line); Loundy, supra note 5, at 82-86 (describing
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over great distances via the Internet also has introduced a new medium
for spreading defamation8 and pornography,9 and has provided a unique
forum for committing criminal acts." However, given the rapid
development of the Internet and other similar networks, 1 the legal
response to civil and criminal liability for acts committed on or through
these networks has been limited."
Although some federal and state laws directly address computerrelated crimes," the usual response is to apply traditional legal doctrines to network wrongdoing. 4 In some cases, the law can and should
remain the same for both computer and noncomputer misconduct. 5 But
much of the law is unable to regulate the special computer domain that
has colloquially become known as "cyberspace." 6 In cyberspace, the

various forms of communication offered by computer information systems).
8. Phillip H. Ault, Introduction to PartSix: Living in the InformationSociety, supra note
4, at 415; Jonathan Gilbert, Note, ComputerBulletin Board OperatorLiabilityfor User Misuse,
54 FoRD. L. REV. 439, 439 (1985); Robert B. Charles, A New World of On-Line Libel, LEGAL
IMEs, Jan. 6, 1992, at 16, 18.
9. Becker, supra note 1, at 204-05; Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel and the
FirstAmendment, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 555, 556 n.6 (1992); Daniel Pearl, Government Tackles a
Surge of Smut on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at B1; see also Loundy, supra note
5, at 101-04 (discussing child pornography on computers).
10. Becker, supra note 1, at 204-05; see Loundy, supra note 5, at 104-07 (discussing
"computer crime" and "computer fraud"); Mark Eckenwiler, Criminal Law and the Internet,
LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1995, at S32.
11. Other popular large networks include CompuServe and Prodigy. See Loundy, supra
note 5, at 86 & n.22. There are also America OnLine and legal and media databases such as
WESTLAW and Lexis. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the FirstAmendment, and Equal
Access to ElectronicNetworks, HARV. J.L. & TECH., Spring 1992, at 65, 65 n.1.
12. Loundy, supra note 5, at 81.
13. See, e.g., Communications Deceny Act of 1996, Pub.-L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-561
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 47 U.S.C.) (crimes involving indecent communications to minors). However, the enforcement of these provisions were recently enjoined on First
Amendment grounds by American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, Nos. CIV A. 96-963, CIV. A.
96-1458, 1996 WL 311865, * 64 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) (crimes
involving computer fraud); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102521 (1994) (crimes involving electronic communication interception); Florida Computer Crimes
Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 815.01-.07 (1995) (crimes involving computers); Computer Pornography and
Child Exploitation Prevention Act of 1986, FLA. STAT. § 847.0135 (1995) (crimes related to
computer pornography).
14. See infra Part Ill.
15. For example, many criminal law doctrines can be readily adapted to on-line behavior.
Statutes prohibiting theft, child pornography, and fraud should equally apply to people who carry
out crimes on the Internet. See supra note 13.
16. This term has been credited to William Gibson, who used it in his 1984 book
Neuromancer. See Schlachter, supra note 6, at 89 n.1. Cyberspace is commonly defined as a
virtual reality comprised of electronic data and information. Id. Cyberspace is generally accessed
through a computer and seen through a video display or other visual output devices. See id.
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law should adapt to reflect the dichotomy between acts committed on
computer systems and similar acts committed outside cyberspace.
Defamation law provides a prime reason to establish this legal
dichotomy. This tort provides a civil remedy for persons harmed by the
unprivileged publication of false statements. 7 Although no legal
dichotomy is needed to represent the liability of the creator of a
defamatory message, 8 the current system of defamation cannot
adequately represent the realities of operators or administrators of
Internet systems. 9 Specifically, this Article examines this area of the
law of defamation with respect to Usenet, the "newsgroup" service of
the Internet2 ° First, this Article discusses the various options for
newsgroup moderator liability under the current framework of defamation. Second, this Article argues that this framework does not sufficiently fit the realities of newsgroup moderators on a large computer
network. Finally, this Article suggests alternatives that may balance the

An example of a cyberspace domain is a chat or conference room on a bulletin board
service. See id. at 108 & n.97. Although users of these services are really only in the sense of
"real time," not in a physical room, their domain may be limited so that they can talk to only
those users in that room. See id.; Becker, supra note 1, at 212. They may have the choice of
whether to speak out loud to the entire conference area or to whisper private, brief messages to
particular people currently logged on. See Becker, supra note 1, at 212 n.37. Through the ability
to mimic communication of the physical world, cyberspace is in many respects an alternate
electronic dimensipn in which users can replicate tasks performed in "real life." See Loundy,
supra note 5, at 84 n.13.
17. See BLACK'S LAW DIc'rIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See Charles, supra note 1, at 134-36.
19. Becker, supra note 1, at 205; Charles, supra note I, at 134-36.
20. See infra Part II.B. (discussing what Usenet is and how it works). Although
newsgroups do take different forms, they generally provide a central meeting place for
discussing a particular topic. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 178. These topics range from
the normal, such as sports, television, religion, computers, and food, to the more arcane, such
as pornography, bondage, and explosives. See id. at 740-94 (listing many current newsgroups).
Special newsgroups may reflect local or regional interest. See id. Media newsgroups, such as
those offered by Clarinet, provide the latest wire service reports on a wide variety of subjects.
Id. at 170-71. Newsgroups are identified by a series of names, separated by periods. Id. at 17274. Each name reflects a hierarchy of general groups and more specialized subgroups, and
refines the scope of the identified group. Id. at 166-68. For example, rec.sports.waterskiing
means that the group is found under the general "rec" (recreational) group, a subgroup dealing
with "sports," and a sub-subgroup about "waterskiing." See id. (providing similar examples).
Thus, newsgroups may be as narrow (rec.sports.fan.baseball.atlanta-braves) or as broad
(soc.singles) as maybe desired.
Most newsgroups (a notable exception are the Clarinet newsgroups) allow a user to "post"
messages to the newsgroup and other users to respond to posted messages. See id. at 171. Thus,
newsgroups often support many threads, or running dialogues on a particular topic, at any given
time.
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interests between maintaining the free flow of information on the
Internet and protecting the rights and goals of the network and its users.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET AND USENET

In order to fully understand the difficulties in applying traditional
defamation law to the Internet and Usenet, one must first analyze how
this computer network operates. Furthermore, an introduction to the
Internet may illuminate the differences between computer-based
communications and more traditional media, such as newspapers. These
differences are important to determine whether defamation law can
simply be "mapped" onto perceived cyberspace equivalents of traditional
media."
A. What Is the Internet?
The Internet is one of the largest networks of computer information
resources.' The Internet began as a computer network called
Arpanet.' The Department of Defense developed Arpanet in the late
1960s to link communications among military installations in order to
survive a nuclear exchange involving the United States.24 Later, this
military system was expanded to include computer networks connecting
academic and research communities.' This network eventually became
the Internet.26 One writer has reported that in 1993, the Internet had
more than 20 million users in 135 countries, and carried approximately
45 billion packets of information a month.27 Another reporter stated
that in 1994, there were 25 million Internet users.28 A 1996 estimate
claimed that more than 40 million people worldwide use the Internet.29
Despite its vast size and increasing usage worldwide, the Internet is
largely unregulated. 3' However, the Internet is supported at each site
21. It is difficult to compare cyberspace media with traditional media forms. See Cutrera,
supra note 9, at 556 (describing computer networks as "strange, hybrid entities that defy the
legal system's propensity to define and pigeon-hole human constructs").
22. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Molly Ivins, Do Not Censor My Cyberspace,GAINESVILLE SUN, Apr. 7, 1995, at 8A.
The premise behind Arpanet was to create a flexible network of communications that would
survive, even after a network member had been destroyed. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.; Tommd Chen, Sense and Censorshipon the Internet, BUS. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995,

at 15.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Heinke & Rafter, supra note 6, at 2.
See Brent Staples, Beastly Mannersin Cyberspace,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1994, at A26.
Reno, 1996 WL 311865, at *4.
See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 3.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

by a system or network administrator, who ensures that the network is
functioning properly at that site.3' Internet sites are supported by
academic and governmental institutions, as well as by private companies
and organizations. 32 Smaller networks called local-area networks, or
LANs, allow distribution of computer services within a particular site.33
Users can access the Internet in a variety of ways. First, a user can
connect a computer directly to the Internet. 34 A direct Internet connection can have two forms.35 One type of connection is through a
computer that is physically hard-wired to the network system. 36 The
other is through terminals which do nothing but provide access to a
computer attached directly to the Internet. 37 An example of the former
might be a workstation plugged into the Internet through a special
cable. 38 An example of the latter is lab terminal comprised of merely
a keyboard and a monitor connected to a computer which provides
Internet access.39
Second, a user can connect to the Internet through a "dial-up"
connection.' The dial-up method requires a computer, a modem, 4' and
a telephone line. 42 A modem, which is connected from the user's
computer to a standard phone jack, sends information to the computer
with Internet access.43 It also is possible to place a home computer on
the Internet through a dial-up service." This allows the user's computer
to maintain its own unique address on the Internet.45
Once a user has access, the Internet allows users to communicate
ideas and information and to share expensive computer resources.4 6
31. See id. at 10-11.
32. See id. (describing how these institutions implement both large- and wide-area
networks, which are then connected to the Internet).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 35. A computer attached directly to the Internet will have its own electronic
"address," or unique identifier. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The term "modem" stands for "modulator-demodulator," which represents the
conversion from a digital computer signal to an analog telephone signal (modulation) and its
conversion back to digital on the other end (demodulation). Id. at 36.
42. Id. at 35-36.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. at 39-40. However, a dial-up service can be difficult and costly to set up and
maintain. Id. at 40.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 10.
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Most Internet providers allow their users to receive electronic mail,
transfer files, connect to other Internet computers, and access Usenet,
the Internet's system of news and discussion groups.47 Many Internet
providers also feature on-line chat or talk facilities, text editing,
computer programming compilers, and other utilities." However, this
Article focuses solely on the use of Usenet newsgroups on the Internet.
B. What Is Usenet and What Are Newsgroups?
Unlike the Internet, Usenet is not a separate network entity.4 9
Rather, it is merely a network service which uses the Internet to provide
access to a collection of newsgroups50 A newsgroup is a computerized
version of a bulletin board, upon which users can post messages and
topics for discussion on a particular subject. 1 Overall, Usenet boasts
more than 11,000 newsgroups5 2 with new newsgroups frequently being
created.53
Usenet is composed of approximately 76,000 Internet and nonInternet sites which collect and propagate newsgroup messages." Each
site is run by a news administrator who ensures that his or her news
server is running and that messages are reaching machines at the news
administrator's site. 5 Therefore, unlike newsgroup services on networks such as CompuServe or Prodigy, no centrally organized authority
manages Usenet.56 Despite this lack of centralized authority, much of
is guided by generally accepted conventions, or
Usenet's content
"netiquette, ' 5 7 that have been developed to foster cooperation among
users.58 Violations of these conventions may subject the offender to

47. Id. at 19-23; see infra Part II.B. (discussing what Usenet is and how it works).
48. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 20-23.
49. Id.at 161.
50. Id.at 158-60. The term "Usenet" is an abbreviation of "users network." Id.at 161.

51. Id.
52. The number of current newsgroups was determined by accessing the Netcom
Communications, Inc. newsgroup database.
53. Id.at 172. Over one six-month span, the number of newsgroups grew by approximately 26%. Id.For a discussion of how new newsgroups are started, see id.at 178-79.

54. Id.at 165.
55. Id.
at 162.
56. Id.at 162-63.
57. While presenting ten governing core rules, one writer defines netiquette as a set of
requirements to "get along" in the cyberspace society. VIRGINIA SHEA, NETIQUETIE 19, 32-33

(1994).
58. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 163.
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public criticisms called "flames,"5 9 or private rebukes to the offender's
personal mailbox.'
Usenet newsgroups may be moderated or unmoderated.6 ' Users have
restricted access to moderated newsgroups.' A user may send an
article to a moderated group in the same way as an unmoderated group,
but the article is first routed to a moderator.63 The moderator may edit
or refuse to post an article that does not conform to a particular topic or
that does not meet the moderator's quality standards.' Therefore, a
moderator has a great deal of control over which articles will be
disseminated through a moderated newsgroup.65
Alternatively, any user can post a message or "article" to an
unmoderated newsgroup without restriction.' Articles posted to
unmoderated newsgroups are not edited for content, quality, or length.67
An overwhelming majority of the newsgroups on Usenet are
unmoderated. s
III. DEFAMATION AND NETWORK OPERATOR LIABILITY

A. Defamation Standards
Generally stated, defamation provides a. remedy for damages
proximately caused by the publication or declaration of a false,
defamatory, and unprivileged statement to a third person. 9 Some
jurisdictions also require a finding of malice on the part of the publisher
or speaker.7" For example, in Florida, the statement must expose a
person to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or injury to the person's business
or profession.7 ' In Florida, slander, or oral defamation, may be action59. Id. at 199.
60. Id. at 163.
61. Id. at 175. On Clarinet, a third method to access news, users cannot post messages.
Id. at 171. Rather, a private company that provides Clarinet posts news articles from UPI and
other wire services. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Authors Hahn and Stout view a moderated newsgroup as a form of "censorship."
Id. at 175.
66. See id. at 175.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Cooper v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 31 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla. 1947).
70. See, e.g., Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 238 (Fla. 1933) ("Without malice, either
express or implied by law, no tort could result from the publication of a defamatory statement
concerning another, however untrue it might be."). A court may imply malice when a false or
defamatory statement is published without an excuse. Id.
71. Perez v. City of Key West, 823 F. Supp. 934, 938 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Layne, 146
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able per se if it imputes to another: (1) a felonious offense; (2) a
presently existing venereal or communicable disease; (3) a course of
conduct incompatible with the defamed person's business; or (4) if a
woman, unchastity. 2 A plaintiff who can classify a defamatory
statement into one of these four categories does not need to plead or
prove damages because they are presumed as a matter of law.73
Damages are presumed for these types of communications because they
necessarily cause injury to a person's reputation or standing in the
community. 4 If an allegedly defamatory statement does not fall into
one of these categories, the plaintiff must then plead and prove special
damages." Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
suing under Florida law and alleging slander which is not per se, must
show that she suffered economic or pecuniary losses stemming from the
injury to her reputation 6
Similarly, under Florida law, libel may be actionable per se without
proof of malice or damages.77 To successfully prove libel per se, a
plaintiff must plead and prove that an average person would find that
the defendant's written statement alone caused injury. If the plaintiff
can show libel per se, she does not need to prove special damages to
recover. 9 However, a statement which is not libelous on its face
requires proof of special harm.8"
Although the common law widely recognized the libel-slander
distinction, new forms of technology and communication have blurred
the line between the two types of defamation.8 Originally, this
distinction depended on whether the defamatory statement was oral
(slander) or written (libel). 2 Early common law considered libel a

So. at 237-38).
72. Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (quoting Campbell v.
Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495,497 (Fla. 1953)). This is also commonly called slander
per se. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 777.
76. See id.; Barry College v. Hull, 353 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. b (1976).
77. Perez, 823 F. Supp. at 938; Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
78. Perez, 823 F. Supp. at 938. The determination of whether a libelous statement is per
se defamatory must be made "without reference to anything except the words used." Wolfson,
273 So. 2d at 778.
79. See Perez, 823 F. Supp. at 938; Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1002 n.3.
(App. Div. 1984).
80. See Perez, 823 F. Supp. at 938.
81. Matherson, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
82. Id.
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more serious offense than slander because few people could read or
write; thus, the written word carried a "louder ring of purported
truth."83 Furthermore, written defamation was permanent and could be
widely disseminated.8 4 In modem times, however, statements broadcast
over radio and television can reach a larger audience than written statements.8 5 Thus, a number of courts have reasoned that defamatory
material published over radio and television should be classified as
libel.86
The early development of defamation law was a product of state
common law8 7 until the United States Supreme Court held that, in
certain circumstances, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
protects defamatory speech. 8 In the landmark case of New York Times
v. Sullivan, 9 an Alabama city commissioner sued the New York Times
for defamation after it published an advertisement claiming that he and
other commissioners were conducting a "wave of terror" against
African-Americans." ° In reversing a verdict for the commissioner, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited a public
official from seeking damages for a defamatory statement relating to his
or her official duties, unless he or she could show that the statement was
made with actual malice.9' The Court defined actual malice as knowledge or reckless disregard for whether or not the statement was false. 92
The Court reasoned that the need to protect the ability to criticize public
officials outweighed any harm those officials might suffer."
Later Supreme Court decisions applied the New York Times holding
to "public figures" as well.94 However, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
83. Id. (citing MARC A. FRANKLIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: INJURIES AND
REMEDIES 898 (2d ed. 1979)).
84. Id.
85. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.3d
1311, 1325-29 (1973).
86. See id.
87. Charles, supra note 1, at 127.
88. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The First Amendment
provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I. This amendment has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and the doctrine of incorporation. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90. Id. at 256-58.
9 I.
Id. at 279-80. Thus, the Court reversed the jury verdict because it did not state that
the defendants had made the statements with actual malice. Id. at 283-84.
92. Id. at 279-80.
93. See id. at 281-82.
94. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967). Although the Supreme
Court's definition of a public figure is not clear, the Curtis PublishingCourt described this term
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Inc.,95 the Court refused to extend the New York Times holding to
private persons.96 In Gertz, a private person claimed that the publisher
of a magazine defamed him.97 The Court held that the constitutional
protection afforded for statements about public officials was not
applicable to private individuals, even when the matter was of general
or public interest.98 Although the Court did not extend First Amendment protection to defamatory statements against a private individual,
the Court refused to allow states to impose strict liability for defamation. 9 Nonetheless, the Gertz Court explicitly acknowledged that states
have a legitimate interest in protecting individuals from wrongful injury
arising out of defamation." The Court noted that in protecting this
interest, states must at least require a negligence standard of liability and
may not constitutionally permit recovery of presumed or punitive
damages without a finding of actual malice."'
Although the Gertz holding applied to defamation of a private person
involving matters of general or public concern, the Court implied that
its rationale could also be extended to any type of defamation of any
private plaintiff, including statements regarding matters of purely private
concern."' The Court directly addressed this situation in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 3 In Dun & Bradstreet,
a construction contractor sued a credit reporting agency for defamation
after the credit agency issued a false report to the contractor's creditors
claiming that the contractor had filed for bankruptcy.""° After the trial
court awarded the contractor presumed and punitive damages, the credit
agency appealed and claimed that under Gertz, presumed or punitive
damages could not be awarded unless a plaintiff shows that the
defendant acted with actual malice. The Court held that speech on
matters of purely private concern did not invoke the same First

to mean a person who "command[s] sufficient continuing public interest and ha[s] sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." Id. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
95. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
96. Id. at 345-46; Cutrera, supra note 9, at 564.
97. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 327.
98. Id. at 345-46.

99. Id. at 347.
100. Id. at 348-49.
101. Id. at 349.
102. See id. at 345-48 (discussing reasons for not imposing First Amendment concerns upon
private plaintiffs, without regard to the public or private nature of the subject matter).
103. 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see Cutrera,supra note 9, at 565.
104. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 751-52.

105. Id. at 752.
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Amendment concerns that New York Times and Gertz sought to
protect. 1°6
In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that statements of private
concern did not interfere with "free and robust debate of public
issues.'' 7 Furthermore, restricting First Amendment protection when
only private concerns are involved neither denies individuals a right to
redress the government nor induces self-censorship upon the press, two
policy concerns that often trigger constitutional protection. 8 The
Court found that in a case with a private plaintiff and private subject
matter, states have a "substantial" interest in providing a remedy, even
when the plaintiff may not be able to prove actual damages."° To
further this state interest, states may permit awards of presumed or
punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice."0 The Court
concluded that the agency's defamatory credit report did not address
matters of public concern, and thus the plaintiff could recover presumed
and punitive damages without showing actual malice."'
B. Primary and Secondary Publishers
Reflecting the Supreme Court's decisions in the area of defamation,
state courts now generally distinguish between the type of injured
plaintiff in a defamation suit and the nature of the communication."'
Defamation standards also vary depending on the character of the party
who causes the defamatory statement to be published."' The author of
a defamatory statement may be liable under the standards of defamation
previously discussed. "4 Similarly, primary publishers such as magazines and newspapers can be held liable for publishing a defamatory
statement." 5 Primary publishers are responsible for a defamatory
statement because they are in complete control of the writing, editing,
and publication of such material." 6 In fact, many of the common law

106. Id. at 759.
107. Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359,
1363 (Or. 1977)); see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (stating that the First Amendment
ensures that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
108. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 760 (citing Harley-Davidson, 568 P.2d at 1363).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 761.
111. See id. at 761, 763.
112. See Cutrera, supra note 9, at 569.
113. See id.
114. E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (finding credit agency as author liable);
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 805 (Fla. 1984) (finding individual as author not liable).
115. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
116. See Joseph P. Thornton et al., Legal Issues in Electronic Publishing-Libel,36 FED.
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defamation cases"1 7 and defamation cases involving constitutional
issues have involved publisher liability." 8
On the other hand, parties who merely act as distributors of
defamatory material, known as secondary publishers, may be held liable
only if they know or have reason to know about the defamatory
statement." 9 Bookstores, libraries, telegraph companies, and news
dealers are common examples of secondary publishers.1" The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 578 provides that "[e]xcept as to those
who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person,
one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject
to liability as if he had originally published it."..' To be considered a
secondary publisher, the distributor must not alter, recopy, or otherwise
exhibit direct control over the original material."
A common carrier also may be liable for defamation." A common
carrier generally is defined as an operator that indifferently provides a
specific service to whomever desires it, thereby allowing subscribers to
transmit information of their choice without control from the operator. 24 Even if a common carrier knows that the false statements exist,
COMM. L.J. 178, 179 (1984) (stating that many people who aid in the publication of a
defamatory statement may be held liable as a primary publisher); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581 cmt. c (1976).
117. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239, 240-41 (Fla. 1984)
(developing Florida law of defamation in the context of publisher liability).
118. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326-27 (magazine editor); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31 (1971) (radio station); Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 135 (magazine
publisher); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256 (newspaper publisher); Edward A. Cavazos, Note,
Computer Bulletin Board Systems and the Right of Reply: Redefining Defamation Liabilityfor
a New Technology, 12 REV. LITIO. 231, 234-37 (1992). For more citations to cases discussing
newspaper and magazine publisher liability, see Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30 n.1.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1976); see, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib.
Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (magazine distributor), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985);
Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948) (article distributor). The
Supreme Court has acknowledged the distinction between primary and secondary publishers,
albeit in the criminal context. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). In Smith, a
bookstore owner was convicted under a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the possession of
obscene materials in a place where books are sold. Id. at 148. The ordinance imposed strict
criminal liability. Id. at 149. The Court found that by not requiring knowledge of the content of
the material sold, the city ordinance placed a "severe limitation on the public's access to
constitutionally protected matter." Id. at 153. Thus, distributors could not be held liable for the
material distributed without some showing of knowledge of its contents. See id.
120. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 568.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1976).
122. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 568.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612(2) (1976); Cutrera, supra note 9, at 566.
124. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (quoting Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. KuyKendall, 275 U.S. 207, 211-12
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it is generally not held liable for its users' defamatory statements, even
if it knows that the false statements exist."n Common carrier status
generally provides more protection to disseminators than the protection
afforded by New York Times. 6 By removing the burden of inspecting
and regulating individual communication, this status protects a common
carrier from most tort liability, thus ensuring efficient communication
services to a large number of people.'27 The common carrier rule also
prevents communication agents from becoming sponsors or endorsers of
a particular message."2 However, without litigation, it is often difficult
to determine whether a particular service is a common carrier and thus
29
qualifies for this higher level of immunity from defamation liability.
C. TraditionalDefamation Liability with Respect
to Operators of Computer Networks
1. Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.
As can be expected, few courts have applied these principles of
defamation law to computer networks like the Internet. At least two
cases involving computer services have received recent notoriety. In
Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 3 a subscriber of the Dow Jones
News/Retrieval service received investment information about a
Canadian corporation. 3 ' The subscriber used this information to invest
in the corporation; however, the information did not reveal that the
stated prices were in Canadian, not United States, dollars. 32 The
subscriber sued the service, claiming
that it had negligently published
33
false and misleading statements.
First, the Daniel court noted that a news service is not liable to
readers for printing negligent statements." 3 Furthermore, the court

(1927)).
125. See, e.g., Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612(2) (1976).
126. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 567.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994) (defining a
common carrier as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio").
130. 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. 1987).
131. Id. at 335. The Dow Jones News/Retrieval service provides to up-to-date news and
information for a per minute user fee. Id. In 1986, the Dow Jones service had more than 200,000
subscribers. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 336.
134. Id. (citing Jaillet v. Cashman, 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), affid, 194 N.Y.S. 947
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stated that liability for making a negligent misstatement does not exist
without a "special relationship" between the parties.'35 In examining
the relationship between the subscriber and the electronic news service,
the court equated the service to a "moderate circulation newspaper or
subscription newsletter."' 36 The court found that the subscriber of the
computer service was "functionally identical" to a reader of a newspaper.'37 Because a newspaper could not be held liable for negligent
misstatements, the court held that the subscriber could not maintain a
cause of
action against the computer service for its negligent misstate38
ments.1
Second, the Daniel court stated that the subscriber's suit was barred
by the First Amendment. 39 Citing Gertz, the court found that the First
Amendment protected the media from liability in the absence of actual
malice."4 The court likened the service to a media defendant and
asserted that it was entitled to the "fullest protection of the First
Amendment.''. Thus, the court held that even if the material were
false or misleading,'42 the subscriber could not hold Dow Jones liable
for merely negligently publishing material on the computer database.'43
Although the facts of Daniel only obliquely pertain to the issue of
Usenet defamation, Judge Friedman's opinion in Daniel may nevertheless apply to other computer service cases. First, he recognized the need
for the law to adapt to changing technology.'" However, he added a

(App. Div. 1922), affid, 139 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923)). The Daniel court stated that this rule had
been followed in other jurisdictions. See id. at 338.
135. Id. at 336-37. For example, a "special relationship" can exist between accountants and
members of a defined group of interests that the accountant is supposed to serve. Id. at 337
(citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985)). Another
example of this relationship is when the United States publishes maritime and aviation charts.
Id.
136. Id. at 337.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 338.
139. Id. at 339.
140. See id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340). Although the Daniel court recognized the
tenuousness of a media/nonmedia defendant distinction that seemed to arise from Gertz, the
court acknowledged that this question was not dispositive of the instant case because the service
so closely resembled a media provider. Id. at 339-40.
141. Id. at 340 (citing P.A.M. News Corp. v. Butz, 514 F.2d 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
142. The Daniel court did not address the issue of whether the service's report was true.
Id. at 340. However, in response to the subscriber's assertion that the failure to state the price
in Canadian currency made the entire report misleading, the court noted that some media in
rebuffing the subscribers falsehood must be tolerated to generally protect a free press. Id. (citing
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
143. See id. at 340.
144. Id. at 338 ('Technological advances must continually be evaluated and their relation
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caveat: "[I]f the substance of a transaction has not changed, new
technology does not require a new legal rule merely because of its
novelty."1 45 This caveat implies that if a type of technology alters the
way people communicate with each other, then the law should change
accordingly."4 In Daniel, Judge Friedman did not believe that Dow
Jones' news service performed functions differently than those of the
Wall Street Journal.47 Nonetheless, Judge Friedman's comments
indicate that he would be inclined48 to recognize changes in the law when
new technology warrants them.
Additionally, Daniel offers computer services similar to Dow Jones
the First Amendment protections usually afforded to traditional media
defendants. 49 However, it seems that this protective standard might
apply to computer services which do not resemble media services. First,
Judge Friedman noted that the distinction between media and nonmedia
defendants "makes little sense" given the rapid changes in communications. 5 Second, he recognized that New York courts, which have a
large caseload, have not addressed this dichotomy.' 5 ' Finally, he
asserted that the actual malice standard promotes "[t]he societal right to
free and unhampered dissemination of information . ,,.52
Arguably,
computer services that do not resemble traditional media functions, like
the Internet, may still qualify for First Amendment protection under the
Daniel rationale.
2. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.
At least one court has attempted to set a standard of defamation
liability for a particular aspect of a nationwide computer network. In
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 53 a small computer database service
to legal rules determined so that antiquated rules are not misapplied in modem settings.").
145. Id.
146. See id. at 335 (posing the question of whether "technological advances require
rethinking of legal principles that have existed for previous modalities").
147. See id. at 337. Arguably, however, this news service was technologically more
advanced than a regular newspaper. A user could query the database for specific subjects or
words, and the computer would return articles matching those specifications. Id. at 335. Searches
of the actual newspaper would take significantly longer. In addition, Dow Jones probably
provided news at least a day ahead of a regular newspaper. Thus, it could be argued that Dow
Jones was more than just a new way of transmitting news.
148. See id. at 338.
149. Id. at 339-40.
150. Id. at 339.
151. Id. at 339-40.
152. Id. at 339. One of the basic purposes of the Internet is to allow free and unfettered
access to information. See infra text accompanying notes 248-49.
153. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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and its operator claimed that CompuServe libeled them by allowing
allegedly defamatory statements to be posted to a database service. 54
CompuServe's computer network featured more than 150 "forums," each
of which provided bulletin boards, interactive chat lines, and informational databases. 5 One of these, the Journalism Forum, was managed
and edited by an independent contractor.156 This forum contained a
daily newsletter called "Rumorville USA" which reported news on
journalists and broadcasters." One Rumorville remark contained
suggestions that the plaintiffs' computer gossip service was a " 'new
start-up scam' "which published information received from Rumorville
'through some back door.' 158
Based on these statements, the plaintiffs sued CompuServe as a
publisher of the false statements. 9 CompuServe did not deny that the
statements were defamatory, but asserted that it acted as a distributor
1 6° Because of this status, CompuServe argued that
and not a publisher.
the correct legal standard was whether it knew or had reason to know
of the statements. 61 CompuServe claimed that it was not liable under
this standard because it did not review the contents of the forum before
they were uploaded to the network." Therefore, CompuServe moved
for summary judgment on the issue of liability. 63
One issue in Cubby was whether CompuServe was a distributor or
publisher for the purposes of applying defamation liability."6 In order
to classify the network, the court attempted to equate it with a comparable nonelectronic information service. 6 In doing so, the court chose
to characterize CompuServe as a service which resembled a for-profit
library or a "traditional news vendor."'" The court noted that the
network "carries a vast number of publications and collects usage and
membership fees from its subscribers in return for access to the

154. See id. at 137. CompuServe maintained and operated CompuServe Information

Service, "an on-line general information service... that subscribers may access from a personal
computer or terminal." Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138 (quoting Plaintiffs Affidavit, I[5-9, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
Id.

160. Id.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 139.
Id. at 140 & n.1.
Id. at 138.
See id.at 139.
See id. at 140.
Id.
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publications.' 67 Given the large amount of information uploaded daily
and the rapid speed of transmission, it would be impractical for the
network to monitor everything sent to its computers.' 68 The court also
considered that the application of a lower standard of liability would
hinder the free flow of information over the network.'6 9 Thus, by using
an analysis similar to Daniel, the Cubby court found that CompuServe
more closely resembled a distributor than a primary publisher. 7
Also, the court focused on the lack of editorial control over the
publication process of the material on the individual forum. 7 ' Because
the Journalism Forum was largely maintained by an unrelated independent contractor, CompuServe had little opportunity to inspect the
material before offering it to the public.' Additionally, CompuServe
could not possibly exercise enough editorial control to monitor the large
quantities of information placed upon its computer systems.' The
court again compared the amount of editorial control that CompuServe
exercised to that of ordinary non-computer distributors, such as libraries,
bookstores, and newsstands. 74 Citing the Daniel court with approval,
the Cubby court held that CompuServe was a traditional distributor
rather than a publisher of information.'75 Applying the "knew or
should have known" standard used for distributors,' 76 the court concluded that the plaintiffs produced no evidence to suggest that
CompuServe could have been liable for the defamatory comments and
therefore granted summary judgment in favor of CompuServe."
Some inferences can be drawn on the status of computer networks
with respect to defamation liability based on Daniel and Cubby. First,
both courts drew a parallel between the computer network and a wellknown, non-computer information system.'78 Both analyses tried to fit
a changed system of communication into the traditional categories of

167. Id.
168. Id. at 140 & n.1.
169. Id. at 140.
170. See id.; Sassan, supra note 2, at 829.
171. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
172. Id. at 140 & n.1.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 140.
175. Id. at 140-41 (citing Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 340).
176. See supra text accompanying note 98.
177. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141.
178. See id. at 140; Daniel,520 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38. The attempt to apply traditional legal
norms to cyberspace by comparing electronic to nonelectronic media is sometimes referred to
as a "mapping" analysis. See David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data
Communications Onto Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our
Contracts)Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1993).
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defamation liability.'79 However, some network functions do not have
a direct non-computer analog.' For example, an unmoderated Usenet
newsgroup arguably resembles both a "newsstand" and a "bulletin
board" because users not only read messages, but also post messages of
their own to the newsgroup. 8 ' Although both courts recognized that
computer networks provide a novel method to communicate and retrieve
information," Usenet newsgroup moderators do not seem to fit under
a single traditional communication paradigm.' Thus, this "mapping"
analysis' only supports the notion that defamation law should not
apply to Usenet moderators.
Though not at issue in Daniel, the Cubby court focused on the
editorial control of the disseminator in determining the appropriate
standard of liability.'85 Under New York law, distributors, as opposed
to republishers, were only liable for defamation if they knew or had
reason to know of the defamation.'86 In determining whether
CompuServe met this scienter requirement, the court looked at the
degree of editorial control CompuServe exerted over the Journalism
Forum.8 7 The court found that CompuServe's independent contractor
uploaded data onto CompuServe's computers, thereby making such data"
immediately available to subscribers. 88 CompuServe did not review
or revise any of the Journalism Forum material, and the Cubby court
maintained that imposing such a burden would inhibit CompuServe's
ability to establish a free flow of information on its service. 9 Thus,
the court found that the issue of editorial control was an important
factor in19holding CompuServe to the distributor standard of defamation
liability. 0

179. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140; Daniel,520 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38.
180. See Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 487-88.
181. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 159, 162-63.
182. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140 ("CompuServe and companies like it are at the forefront
of the information industry revolution."); Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 340 ("[The Dow Jones
service] is one of the modem, technologically interesting, alternative ways the public may obtain
up-to-the-minute news.").
183. See Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 492-98 (asserting that computer bulletin
boards do not fit under the publisher, distributor, or common carrier paradigms).
184. See id. at 487-88; supra note 178.
185. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
186. Id. at 139.

187. Id. at 140.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 139-40. In one of the few judicial decisions to apply Cubby, a New York
state court has held that a computer on-line service was liable as a publisher for the posting of
defamatory material by one of the service's users. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, *4 (May 24, 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 11, 1995). In Stratton Oakmont, an unidentified user of a financial bulletin board on
the Prodigy computer on-line service posted statements claiming that Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a
securities investment banking firm, and its president, committed criminal and fraudulent acts in
connection with an initial public offering. Id. at *1. The plaintiff sued the company providing
the computer network services for libel and argued that Prodigy "exercised sufficient editorial
control over its computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same responsibilities
as a newspaper." Id. at *3.
In finding that Prodigy did exercise the requisite editorial control to incur direct publisher
liability, the Stratton Oakmont court found that despite the fact that 60,000 messages a day are
posted on Prodigy's bulletin boards, Prodigy had established procedures by which it could deter
and eliminate messages which are " 'in bad taste' " or " 'grossly repugnant to community
standards.' " Id. at *2, *3. These procedures included (i) the development of "content
guidelines" designed to communicate to users Prodigy's policy against posting articles which,
inter alia," 'are deemed harmful to maintaining a harmonious online community' "; (ii) the use
of a software screening program which "prescreens all bulletin board postings for offensive
language"; and (iii) the use of "Board Leaders" and other management personnel who are
responsible for enforcing Prodigy's content guidelines. Id. at *2. With Prodigy's active use of
these procedures, the Stratton Oakmont court found that Prodigy was able to "clearly [make]
decisions as to content," and to "uniquely [arrogate] to itself the role of determining what is
proper for its members to post and read on the bulletin boards." Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
Thus, applying the Cubby court's rationale, Prodigy should be deemed as a publisher and not
a distributor due to its editorial control over its bulletin boards. Id.
Despite this decision, the Stratton Oakmont court explicitly held that its conclusion is neither
a repudiation of nor a distinction from the Cubby analysis. Id. at *5. Instead, however, it
demonstrates that computer networks which exercise control over the content of its posted
material must "accept the concomitant legal consequences" of such control. Id. Although the
Stratton Oakmont court recognized the fact that increased liability for computer networks such
as Prodigy could prevent such networks from exercising control over content, the court
dismissed this concern by implying that "the market will ... compensate a network for its
increased control and the resulting increased exposure." Id. However, the court's logic is not
sound when applied to the Internet, and Usenet moderators in particular, where there is no
market to compensate Usenet moderators who might possibly incur liability under Stratton
Oakmont as original publishers of articles posted to their newsgroups. See supra Part II.B.
However, in Stem v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995),
nationally-renown radio talk show personality Howard Stem sued an on-line computer network
under New York's commercial misappropriation statute after the computer network featured a
photograph of Stem to advertise an on-line subscriber debate on Stem's candidacy for the office
of governor of New York. Id. at 695. Although Stern involved a claim for commercial
misappropriation of his likeness and not defamation, the issue of whether Delphi, the computer
network, could avail itself of the common law "incidental use exception" as a defense to Stem's
claim depended upon whether Delphi's electronic bulletin board service was essentially a news
disseminator or distributor. Id. at 696. The Stern court concluded that Delphi's on-line
information services, which included "electronic mail, on-line conferences [and] bulletin board
messages," were more akin to that of a news vendor, bookstore or letters-to-the-editor column
of a newspaper, as such services "require purchase of their materials for the public to actually
gain access to the information carried." Id. at 695, 697. In so holding, the Stern court found that
Delphi's services were functionally similar to those provided by CompuServe; therefore, under
Cubby, Delphi's actions as a distributor of information fell under the incidental use exception
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IV. APPLYING TRADITIONAL DEFAMATION LIABILITY
TO USENET MODERATORS

Like the Daniel and Cubby courts, many commentators have asserted
that, although Usenet and similar "bulletin board" systems are technologically different from their non-electronic analogs, the traditional
standards of defamation still apply. 9' Nonetheless, these authorities
fall to agree on a single standard that best represents newsgroup
services."
To apply traditional defamation standards to Usenet, it may be
helpful (and realistic) to borrow from the Cubby analysis because it
offers one of the few comprehensive judicial treatments of computer
networks. Using the Cubby analysis, this section classifies the computer
network service in terms of an analogous non-computer service. This
classification will determine the applicable standard of liability for
Usenet moderated newsgroups.

under New York law. Id. at 697.
Although the Stern decision explicitly reinforces the precedent set by the court in Cubby,
two aspects of the Stern court's reliance upon Cubby remain troubling. In Stem, Judge Goodman
summarily equates the services at issue provided by CompuServe (an on-line newsletter
published by a third party) with those provided by Delphi (an interactive subscriber debate
service). In her factual analysis, however, Judge Goodman did not distinguish the fact that
although Delphi offers electronic services which resemble those of news distributors, such as
news reports, stock market quotations and access to reference sources, it also provides interactive
services where users can post messages and participate in debates and on-line conferences. Id.
at 695. Arguably, such interactive user services do not fit into the "traditional" republisher
paradigm. Nonetheless, it is not clear from her opinion in Stern whether she considered these
latter services in concluding that Delphi was subject to distributor and not a publisher.
Furthermore, in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in Stern, Judge Goodman neglected to
analyze the level of control exercised by the computer service, which was part of the court's
analysis in Cubby. Stern, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697; see Cubby, 775 F. Supp. at 140. Given the
differences in analysis between Stem, Cubby and Stratton Oakmont, it is unclear as to the
precise factor or factors which will be examined by a court when it attempts to fit a particular
computer on-line service into a traditional defamation liability paradigm.
191. See Becker, supra note 1, at 227-30; Cutrera, supra note 9, at 569-76; Loundy, supra
note 5, at 134-43; Schlachter, supra note 6, at 98, 111; Gilbert, supra note 8, at 442.
192. See e.g., Becker, supra note 1, at 228 (treating computer bulletin boards as secondary
publishers); Cutrera, supra note 9, at 569 (asserting that Usenet resembles a common carrier);
Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 490 (suggesting that computer networks should be
governed by contract law and not "extraneously imposed regulations" or traditional defamation
paradigms); Schlachter, supra note 6, at 135-39 (applying primary and secondary liability
paradigms to computer "message posting" services); Charles, supra note 1, at 136 (asserting that
a bulletin board posting service most closely resembles a common carrier); Conner, supra note
5, at 237 (viewing the Cubby application of distributor liability as sound with regard to noninteractive computer services).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

A. Liability of Newsgroup Moderators as Primary Publishers
Applying the traditional defamation framework to Usenet, the
primary publisher liability standard seemingly represents the nature of
most moderated newsgroups.'93 In such a newsgroup, a moderator
takes an article that a user sends to her and decides whether to edit the
article for content or whether to post it at all. 94 Such actions certainly
qualify as "editorial control." In this respect, a moderated newsgroup is
analogous to an editorial page in a newspaper.'95 Editorial page editors
decide which letters are of interest for publication, and many newspapers include disclaimers that they may edit the letters for length or
content."9 Both moderated newsgroups and editorial pages feature
communication from a single subscriber to the whole pool of subscribers.'9 7 Furthermore, in both media, a single subscriber is not permitted
to post an article without the approval of the moderator or editor.'98
In the current defamation jurisprudence, primary publishers of
defamatory statements are liable as if the publisher were the actual
speaker.' Thus, a publisher of defamation likely would be subject to
state tort law if the statement were about a private person in a matter of
purely private concern.2 Otherwise, the communication raises First
Amendment implications and would require either actual malice"0 ' or
a state law standard of at least negligence. 2 In exchange for the right
to control the content of articles, the primary publisher status would
expose newsgroup moderators to the maximum liability for defamation." 3 Therefore, such moderators would need to exercise extreme

care in screening articles to ensure that they do not publish defamatory
statements.
193. See Cutrera, supra note 9, at 569; Loundy, supra note 5, at 135.
194. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175; supra text accompanying notes 62-65. For
example, the newsgroup rec.humor.funny only posts articles with jokes that the moderator thinks
are funny. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175.
195. Jon Wiener, Static in Cyberspace: Free Speech on the Internet, 258 NATION 825, 827
(1994).
196. See, e.g., 'The Letters Policy," FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Jan. 7, 1996, at F2 ("It may
be necessary to condense letters.").
197. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175.
198. See id.; "The Letters Policy," supra note 196, at F2.
199. Charles, supra note I, at 130; supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
200. See Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 761.
201. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (requiring actual malice for public officials in
a matter of public concern). Nonetheless, the distinction between public and private plaintiffs
or concerns may become blurred in the realm of cyberspace. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 570.
202. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (requiring at least negligence for private person in a matter
of public concern).
203. See Schlachter, supra note 6, at 137.
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B. Liability of Newsgroup Moderators as
Secondary Publishers or Distributors
Although the primary publisher status seems appropriate for the
majority of Usenet moderators, it may be possible to classify some
moderators as distributors or secondary publishers. For instance, a
moderator of a newsgroup might not exercise editorial control over the
content of the articles, but instead would transmit them under a fictitious
username in order to protect the identity of the poster. One such
example is the "alt.personals" newsgroup. This newsgroup resembles a
large personal advertisement service. On this group, subscribers are
assigned a unique and nondescript usemame. When a subscriber sends
a personal advertisement to the newsgroup, it is first rerouted to the
moderator, who then reposts the message under this anonymous
usemame. Others may respond to the message by sending mail to the
coded usemame. This reply is then forwarded directly to the subscriber.
Thus, communication between subscribers and other interested parties
is kept completely anonymous until the subscriber wishes to reveal her
identity.
Another example of a non-editorial moderator is the digest
newsgroup moderator. 4 This type of moderator merely collects
articles or other information posted onto the newsgroup and retransmits
them into a digest form according to subject matter, with very little
substantive editing. 5 More commonly, a moderator may limit her
editorial control to ensuring that all articles submitted to a particular
newsgroup are appropriate for that group.2°
Moderators who merely retransmit articles under different names or
in an ordered fashion are comparable to librarians.2" In a library,
books published by others are classified and arranged according to
subject matter. However, in determining whether a Usenet moderator is
a distributor, a court would consider the nature of the control that the
moderator exercises over the article publication process.2 8 In distinguishing between primary and secondary publishers, it is unclear
whether courts would consider editorial control on a sliding scale, or
would instead hold that any editorial control, no matter how slight,
would create publisher liability. Nonetheless, the Restatement has

204. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175. Two such digest newsgroups are
comp.sys.ibm.pc.digest and sci.psychology.digest, Id.

205. Id.
206. Charles, supra note 8, at 18.
207. Under the Cubby analysis, librarians would be considered distributors rather than
primary publishers. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.

208. See, e.g., id.
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apparently defined secondary publishers narrowly as an exception rather
than the rule."l Arguably, Usenet moderators who merely retransmit
articles under a different username or who collect and order submitted
information do not perform the editorial functions of primary publishers.
On the other hand, one commentator has noted that the distributor
category is extremely narrow and few newsgroup moderators could avail
themselves of its protection.2"'
Assuming that a Usenet moderator could utilize the distributor
classification, she would receive significant legal protection against
defamation liability."' The moderator would only be liable for statements that she knew or had reason to know were defamatory."'
Plaintiffs would generally have difficulty proving that the moderator had
actual knowledge of the defamation." 3 For example, the moderator
who merely retransmits articles under a different username could easily
write a computer program that would take the message, look up the
coded usemame in a list, replace the real usemame with the coded
username, and post the anonymous article to the newsgroup, all without
reading the contents of the article. She would then tell her news server
to execute this program hourly or daily, and the newsgroup would
virtually run itself. The distributor rule would protect the moderator
against a defamation suit because she would have had no knowledge of
the defamatory statement in the first place. Although this may oversimplify a moderator's duties, it demonstrates the possibility that a Usenet
moderator could fall under the secondary publisher paradigm. 4

209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1976). Section 578 states, "Except as to
those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or
otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published
it." Id. (emphasis added).
210. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 575.
211. Id.
212. Charles, supra note 1, at 131, 142-44.
213. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 575.
214. One commentator has suggested that Usenet newsgroups may be classified as common
carriers. Id. at 573-75; see also supra text accompanying notes 123-29 for a description of
common carrier status and liability.
Usenet is similar to a common carrier because it transmits information without qualification
for anyone who requests it. See Cutrera, supra note 9, at 574. Most likely, this commentator was
considering only the vast number of Usenet's newsgroups, which are unmoderated. See HAHN
& STOuT, supra note 3, at 175. This Article does not assert that moderated newsgroups resemble
common carriers, because moderators can refuse to post an article if not germane to the
newsgroup. Id.
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V.

CRITIQUE OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL DEFAMATION
LLABILITY TO USENET

A. The "Mapping" Dilemma: Applying
Defamation Law to Cyberspace
In applying the current law of defamation to Usenet, it is necessary
to assume that the comparisons between cyberspace and non-cyberspace
are valid. In fact, many commentators have analyzed the law of
computer-generated defamation by making this assumption.215 However, other commentators have begun to question the application of rigid
rules of law to the relative unknown of cyberspace,2 6 including the
publisher/distributor distinction in the law of defamation.217 Some
commentators have noted that it is often difficult or misleading to try to
analogize electronic services to a non-cyberspace standard, such as a
common carrier, distributor, or publisher.1 Thus, it seems that the law
should be reanalyzed to fit cyberspace, instead of merely trying to fit
cyberspace functions into the holes of traditional defamation law.2" 9
The Restatement and case law interpretations of the publisher
doctrine would have a definite limiting effect on Usenet moderators. 2
Both interpretations appear to set up an all-or-nothing approach in
determining whether a disseminator has acted as a publisher. Arguably,
the slightest amount of editorial control that a moderator exercises could
trigger the primary publisher standard of liability. In turn, this would
subject many Usenet moderators to a variety of common law and
constitutional defamation standards, each with a different measure of
fault.2 ' Furthermore, the specter of tort liability stemming from this
publisher status could deter individuals from forming new moderated
newsgroups.'
Such a rigid rule would have a chilling effect on messages posted to
moderated newsgroups. Moderators may be afraid to allow questionable
articles onto the newsgroup, especially those that might contain flames
of other users. The ability to flame other users for a variety of reasons

215. See Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 487.
216. See, e.g., id. at 488; Cutrera, supra note 9, at 580-81.
217. Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 491-94.
218. See, e.g., Loundy, supra note 5, at 88-89.

219. Cavazos, supra note 118, at 243; Loundy, supra note 5, at 89; see also Reno, 1996
WL 311865, at *52-56 (distinguishing the Internet from broadcast media).
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1976); see also supra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text (examining cases interpreting the publisher doctrine).
221. See supra Part III.A.
222. See Loundy, supra note 5, at 137; cf.Conner, supra note 5, at 237 (arguing that the
"prospect of increased liability" would discourage the formation of new bulletin board systems).
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is considered an Internet right and a way to redress violations of
netiquette.2 3 Additionally, such a standard might make moderators
liable for users sending other types of statements, such as racially
derogatory, obscene, or indecent comments.224
223. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 199.
224. Outside of the defamation law context, moderators are liable for indecent messages
sent to minors under the Communications Decency Act of 1996. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§
223(a)(1)(B), 223(d) (1996). On February 8, 1996, Congress enacted the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 1, 501, 110 Stat. 56, 56, 133
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 and 47 U.S.C.). Section 502(1) of the CDA amends 47
U.S.C. § 223(a) to read in relevant part:
(a) Whoever(1) In interstate or foreign communications(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of;
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, message or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker
of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication ...
shall be fined in accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133, § 502(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(l)(B)
(1996)). This statute was intended to reach communications via modem, and thus users of the
Internet and Usenet, because a modem is deemed to be a "telecommunications device." See
Reno, 1996 WL 311865, at *2 n.5. Section 502(2) creates 47 U.S.C. § 223(d), which provides
in relevant part:
(d) Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly(A)
uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses an interactive computer service to display in a manner available
to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication... shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133-34 § 502(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (1996)).
An "interactive computer service" would include services or systems that provide users with
access to the Internet. Id. § 509 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2) (1996)). In enacting this
legislation, Congress sought to protect minors from indecent material available through
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Likewise, the use of the distributor label for moderators without
editorial control also may create difficulties. Although distributor status
provides generous protection against liability, it lessens the role of

interactive computer services, such as the Internet, by imposing criminal penalties upon
individuals who provide such material to minors. Reno, 1996 WL 311965, at *29.
However, the enforcement of both §§ 502(1) and 502(2) was recently challenged on the
grounds that they unconstitutionally restricted speech protected by the First Amendment. In
Reno, various organizations and individuals associated with the Internet and the communications
industry filed a temporary restraining order against enforcement of §§ 502(1) and 502(2). Id. at
*1. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions of the CDA violate the First and Fifth
Amendments because they "effectively ban[ ] a substantial category of protected speech from
most parts of the Internet." ML at *32. A three-judge panel convened pursuant to § 56 1(a) of the
CDA agreed and enjoined enforcement of these two provisions. Id. at *64. In granting the
injunction against enforcement, the court in Reno held that these provisions violate the First
Amendment by regulating protected speech (i.e., offensive or indecent material) and that specific
statutory defenses designed to protect certain interactive computer service providers from
prosecution under the CDA do not provide a "least restrictive means" of regulation. Id. at *3436. Judge Buckwalter also found these provisions to be void for vagueness, because the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive" could not be clearly defined in cyberspace. See id. at *4243. It is interesting to note that Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.) has in no uncertain terms
requested that the United States Senate call for the Department of Justice to "vigorously defend"
the CDA by appealing the Reno decision to the United States Supreme Court. 142 CONG. REC.
S6864-02, S6889 (Sense of the Senate, as provided in Helms Amendment No. 4209 to S. 1745).
Nonetheless, the Reno decision is particularly enlightening because it presents one of the first
judicial decisions which directly addressed and analyzed the nature and scope of the Internet.
Id. at *4-13 (discussing the origins of, and methods of accessing and communicating via, the
Internet). In determining whether the government can regulate protected speech on the Internet,
the Reno court found that the unique characteristics of the Internet's underlying technology and
the widespread reach of information on the Internet were important factors to be considered. Id.
at *56-57. The court reasoned that, unlike television broadcasts, the Internet requires affirmative
and calculated steps to be taken by its users in order to locate and view indecent or sexually
explicit materials. Id. at *56 & n.19. Additionally, because the Internet is "an abundant and
growing resource," restrictions on television broadcasters which are imposed to allocate limited
broadcasting frequencies and to prevent interference between such frequencies are not applicable
to the Internet. Id. at *56. Furthermore, the Reno court acknowledged the lack of barriers to the
Internet, the "astoundingly diverse content available" there and the fact that "the Internet evolved
free of content-based considerations." Id. at *57.
Undoubtedly, it is unclear whether and how the Reno decision will affect the applicability
of defamation jurisprudence to the Internet. The Reno court was faced with a criminal statute
which imposed jail sentences for the publication of protected speech. Although Reno clearly
prevents the government from regulating in any manner protected speech on the Internet, id. at
*57, this decision did not alter the fact that certain classes of speech, such as child pornography
or obscenity, are not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at *45. Given the fact that New York
Times and its progeny delineates the scope of First Amendment protection for defamatory
speech, it is likely that the protections afforded to Internet service providers (and Usenet
moderators) by Reno do not apply to defamatory speech not protected by the First Amendment.
However, the Reno court's pellucid analysis of the nature and scope of communications on the
Internet may prove helpful for other courts in deciding future issues of Internet defamation.
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moderators in Usenet newsgroups because fewer individuals would
accept the risk of increased liability for defamatory statements.2
Moderators might be wary of exercising editorial control in certain
circumstances for fear of incurring publisher liability. Furthermore,
moderators presumably would be less inclined to set up ground rules for
content, length, or other criteria of the newsgroup for fear that they
would be controlling the content of the group. Thus, the distributor
standard would inhibit the moderator's ability to regulate a group's
subject matter.
As a more fundamental critique, however, some legal commentators
have questioned the continued viability of current defamation law to
adapt to changes in the traditional, nonelectronic media. 2 Defamation
law has been characterized as unclear, confused, dissatisfying, and
impossible to apply.227 Professor Robert Ackerman has argued that the
law of defamation is "feudal in origin" and is today in "chaos. '2
First, defamation is based upon a distinction between slander and libel
which "serves no useful purpose" in today's technological world.229
Because this dichotomy is largely a product of state law, the legal
standards of liability and burdens of proof varies from state to state.23
Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the First Amendment analysis of New
York Times and its progeny against this state law system adds to the
problem of assessing liability for defamatory interstate communication,
both in the traditional media and on the Internet.23' Many courts and
commentators are unclear about whether nonmedia defendants can
utilize the publisher's right to First Amendment protection.232 In fact,
in his Dun & Bradstreet dissent, Justice Brennan acknowledged that
today's advances in communication technology may essentially render
the media/nonmedia dichotomy moot.233 Even if this distinction is

225. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22 (describing distributor status and
standards).
226. Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Searchfor an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REV. 291, 296-301 (1994).
227. Id. at 293; Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New
Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519 (1987).
228. Ackerman, supra note 226, at 294, 296.
229. Id. at 296 ("In an age of broadcast and cable communications and on-line information
services, the effort to maintain a distinction between these two torts serves no useful purpose.").
230. Id. at 297.
231. Id.
232. See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 339-40 (Civ. Ct. 1987);
Ackerman, supra note 226, at 297 & n.20; Smolla, supra note 227, at 1572 tbl. 2 (noting that
the Supreme Court has had no clear direction in determining the fault standard for nonmedia
defendants).
233. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 782 n.7 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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valid today, it is unclear whether it could or should apply to computer
bulletin boards and newsgroups.2"
Second, defamation law has become difficult to apply today because
of the inefficient and costly nature of litigation.235 Defamation suits
often lead to prolonged litigation, which places burdensome expenses
upon defendants who may be ruined financially even if they win in
court. 6 Professor Ackerman has acknowledged that these costs
outweigh the actual harm caused by the defamatory statement.237 This
may prove especially true in cyberspace, as it still is unclear if theories
of reputation loss can be "mapped" to the world of the Internet.23
B. Monitoring Costs May Be Prohibitive
The implementation of the publisher negligence standard of liability
would place a cost-prohibitive burden upon Usenet moderators because
they would presumably need to read every article they posted for
defamatory content. The Supreme Court has recognized that standards
of liability for disseminating material must be reasonable-they cannot
require an impossible or onerous effort to comply with them.239 In
1994, a computer that counts the number of Usenet messages, recorded
an average of 26,400 new messages each day.' ° A major Usenet news
feed service reported that during a two-week period, its feed had
241
received more than 400,000 articles from more than 90,000 users.
It is doubtful that today's moderators have the ability to screen every
article for defamatory content, and the number of Usenet subscribers is
increasing daily.242 Given the increases in Internet and Usenet use,
such a burden will be even heavier, if not entirely impossible, in the
near future.

234. Cavazos, supra note 118, at 231; cf. Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 491-94
(questioning the application of current defamation paradigms to bulletin board systems).
235. Ackerman, supra note 226, at 299.
236. Id. at 299-300.
237. Id. at 300.
238. Daniel Waggoner & Bruce E.H. Johnson, On the Road Again: Detours on the
Information Superhighway, COMM. LAW., Summer 1994, at 3, 4.
239. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
240. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 165.

241. Id.
242. Wiener, supra note 195, at 825.
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C. Liability Is Inimical to the Freedom of the Internet
Although Usenet is not confined to the Internet, many Usenet servers
are located on Internet sites. 43 Furthermore, many Usenet users have
Internet addresses.'" Therefore, any legal standard of defamation
liability should at least consider its effect and interaction with the
unique environment of the Internet. 4 5
For the laws of our world to work in cyberspace, we must first
understand what cyberspace is and how it operates.2 " Many authors
have described the Internet as a vast realm with no state or national
boundaries. 47 Currently, no governmental body or agency controls or
runs the Internet, a characteristic which likely helps to maintain open
access to information.248 Internet services are widely used because they
are available to most people and contain an expansive wealth of
information. 49 Internet users themselves are largely responsible for
maintaining and expanding this accessibility.2 In order to protect and
preserve these qualities, Internet users have grown to be fiercely antitotalitarian in their views of censorship and regulations.2 Instead of
relying upon control and domination, cooperation and adherence to
protocol largely governs conduct in cyberspace.5 2 Users follow
protocol out of respect for each other rather than in adherence to a
particular set of rigid laws or standards.2 53
Despite these attempts at internal control, some commentators believe
that Internet users are not doing enough to police themselves.'
243. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 161.

244. Id. at 165.
245. Cf Reno, 1996 WL 311865, at *56 (considering the unique environment of the
Internet in analyzing the constitutional validity of the CDA); Charles, supra note 8, at 18 (noting
that lawyers must educate judges on new technologies so that decisions may comport with the
various aspects of each medium).
246. See supra note 16 (defining cyberspace).
247. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 2; Chen, supra note 26, at 15.

248. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 3; Ivins, supra note 24, at 8A.
249. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 3.

250. See id.
251. See Tommi Chen, Quotable Quotes: Food for Thought, Bus. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995,
at 16 (quoting various sources). But see Wiener, supra note 195, at 826 (claiming that moderated
newsgroups have actually "abandoned" the "utopian ideal" of free speech on the Internet).
252. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 163. The term "netiquette" is often used to refer to
an unwritten protocol on the Internet, which governs how users interact with the system and
each other. Id. For instance, it is considered a gross breach of netiquette to advertise on Usenet
(except in special newsgroups where such solicitations are permitted) because the Internet is
supposed to be used for the common good rather than to enrich any particular user. Wiener,
supra note 195, at 827.
253. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 163.
254. See, e.g., Martha S. Siegel, Computer Anarchy: A Pleafor Internet Laws to Protect
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Author Martha Siegel has argued that the "broadcasting of sexually
explicit material[,].
sexual harassment, profanity, defamation,
forgery, and fraud" have created the "equivalent of mob rule" on the
Internet. 5 Siegel has attributed Internet abuse to a combination of the
"secretiveness" of on-line communication and a lack of Internet
regulation. 6 To help stem this tide of abuse, she has proposed that
countries and international lawmaking bodies should control electronic
communications at the point of origin.' Additionally, she has asserted
that "legislation should be passed making Internet access providers
common carriers.""
Although some of these claims of abuse may be valid, one Usenet
moderator has noted that the underlying problem stems from the
"logarithmic" increase in Internet users." In conjunction with this
explosion in the number of users worldwide,2' 6 many net-watchers
have commented on a gamut of Internet problems, including netadvertising, garbage posting, and sexism.2 6 Despite these complaints,
Internet groups and users have already responded with their own internal
solutions to resolve these issues. For example, Usenet administrators are
currently developing programs that will cancel repeated and multiple
postings to newsgroups, practices which attempt to drown out particular
viewpoints by crippling a Usenet news server.262 Users also flame
attempts to advertise on Usenet newsgroups.263 Thus, the Internet
community seems more than capable of addressing and correcting these
problems internally.
Furthermore, the imposition of defamation standards on Usenet and
the Internet may be taken as a hostile attempt to force regulation on the
medium rather than allow self-regulation." From the viewpoint of

the Innocent, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1994, at 15. Martha Siegel is a co-author of How to Make a
Fortune on the Internet. Id.
255. Id. But see Reno, 1996 WL 311865, at *64 ("Just as the strength of the Internet is
chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends on the chaos and cacophony of the unfettered
speech the First Amendment protects.") (Dalzell, J.).
256. Siegel, supra note 254, at 15.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Wiener, supra note 195, at 826. Wiener points out," '[a] million new users will bring
a few sociopaths.' "Id. (quoting Joel Furr, a Usenet moderator).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
261. See Wiener, supra note 195, at 826-28.
262. Tony Sidaway, Usenet Post to misc.legal.computing, Mar. 19, 1995, 19:21 GST.
263. Wiener, supra note 195, at 827. See supra text accompanying note 59 for a definition
of flame.
264. See Ivins, supra note 24, at 8A (asserting that congressional leaders who know little
or nothing about cyberspace should not attempt to regulate it).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
278

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Usenet subscribers, this would likely be seen as an imposition of a legal
standard by those who do not completely comprehend the scope and
nature of the network.265 Thus, users might view such an attempt as
incompatible with the basic principles of the Internet.2" Realistically,
no single model of defamation law can best summarize the role of
Usenet moderators.267 However, in the end, the application of these
defamation standards to the Internet may eventually chill the openness
of information and commentary that characterizes the Internet today.26
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

A. Self-Regulation
One alternative to imposing the traditional defamation standards to
Usenet moderators is to allow the network to regulate itself. 269 In
essence, both Usenet and the Internet already have self-regulation
265. See, e.g., id. On February 8, 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 which attempted to criminalize the transmission of indecent or "patently offensive"
materials to minors on the Internet. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56, 133; supra note 224 (describing relevant portions of the Act). However, many
Usenet users are alarmed at this attempt to regulate the Internet. See, e.g., Ivins, supra note 24,
at 8A. One Usenet user stated:
I think the problem is that people who are not "wired" plain simply [sic] do not
understand that the Internet is not like a movie or TV, where it is fairly easy to
control the content-it is more like an [sic] bulletin board, where anyone can put
anything they want on the bulletin board. Would a laundromat be liable if someone
put a centerfold from Hustler on the laundromat's bullentin [sic] board? The
Internet is the same way. The Internet can not be controlled-look at all of the
difficulty we have at controlling [illegal copying of software], and the net.attitude
is that [such activity is equal to] stealing! Even if the US government tried to
control pornography or whatever from all USA domains, nothing, short of the USA
cutting itself off from the rest of the world, stops a kid from downloading a kiddieporn [picture file] from a forign [sic] country. The ONLY way to stop this is for
parents to be responsible .... I do not think the government can protect people
from what they might find on the Internet, however. Finally, I believe in a world
of free ideas.
Sam Trenholme, Usenet Post to comp.org.eff.talk, Mar. 16, 1995, 03:28 EST.
266. See supra text accompanying note 251.
267. Mitchell Kapor, Civil Liberties in Cyberspace: When Does Hacking Turn from an
Exercise of Civil Liberties into Crime?, SCI. AM., Sept. 1991, at 158, 164.
268. See supratext accompanying notes 222-24. See generally Rosalind Resnick, Cybertort:
The New Era, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1994, at Al, A21 (discussing the emergence of defamation
litigation arising from Internet communications); Netwatch: News, Culture, Controversy on the
Internet, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 20 (contemplating Internet self-censorship as a result of an
attempted defamation suit).
269. Charles, supra note I, at 149.
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mechanisms in place, through netiquette,2 7' unwritten codes of protocol, and social pressures.27' Additionally, violations of netiquette are
often greeted with net-wide admonitions in the form of "flames."'272
Moderated newsgroups can refuse to post articles that do not conform
to the topic or that are apt to spark a long "flame war."2" Overly
abusive users run the risk of losing their Internet connections.274
Unfortunately, self-regulation is not a cure-all. Defamation still
occurs through Usenet and the Internet, and the results can sometimes
be harmful beyond self-repair.2 75 With the movement of the Internet
into the mainstream culture, its popularity is ever-increasing,2 6 and,
as Usenet moderator Joel Furr has noted, "[a] million new users will
bring a few sociopaths. ' ' 2n At least one commentator has implicitly
called for legal intervention to halt uncontrollable "cyberspace wrongdoing." 278 Nonetheless, Usenet moderators and users have argued that
they, rather than judges and legislators, better understand how to
respond to problems on the Net.279
B. Automatic Right of Reply
Another possible solution also supports the "in-house" remedy of
providing parties who have been allegedly defamed the right to submit
a reply to the moderated newsgroup. ° This alternative would allow
aggrieved users to vindicate themselves through the medium in which
they were allegedly wronged." Giving Usenet subscribers the right of
reply could provide an efficient alternative to litigation and the
subsequent application of a defamation standard to moderated
newsgroups.
In traditional media contexts, the right of reply remedy has been
criticized.282 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,2 3 the Court
270. See supra note 252.

271. See Wiener, supra note 195, at 827.
272. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 199; Wiener, supra note 195, at 827.
273. HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175; Wiener, supra note 195, at 827.
274. Loundy, supra note 5, at 145.
275. See Wiener, supra note 195, at 827; cf Peter H. Lewis, A New Twist in an On-Line
Libel Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at D10 (discussing a $200 million electronic libel
lawsuit against Prodigy Services Company).
276. Siegel, supra note 254, at 15.
277. Wiener, supra note 195, at 826 (quoting Joel Furr, a Usenet newsgroup moderator).
278. Siegel, supra note 254, at 15.
279. See Ivins, supra note 24, at 8A.
280. Cavazos, supra note 118, at 244.
281. See Richard C. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel,

34 VA. L. REV. 867, 892, 896-97 (1948).
282. See generally Donald Meiklejohn, Speech and the FirstAmendment, Public Speech
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found unconstitutional a state statute that required newspapers to provide
political candidates with a right of reply in response to published
editorials. 84 The Court reasoned that a mandatory right of reply
violated the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment because 2 it85
impermissibly intruded into the editorial duties of a newspaper.
Commentators also have argued that the right of reply is inefficient and
fails to remedy the wrong because of the time gap between the original
defamation and the reply. 86
Although the right of reply has received short shrift in the printed
media context, its application to electronic media may be more
acceptable.2 17 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,88 the Supreme
Court viewed a government-mandated forced right of reply as a benefit
in the public broadcasting area. 9 Usenet seems to provide a more
supportive arena for the use of the right of reply. First, it is not clear
that a moderated newsgroup is a media actor when it publishes other
users' articles. 29 If it is not a media actor akin to an editor, there is
a less likelihood of violating First Amendment principles discussed in
Tornillo.2 1 Second, any time gap between the original posting and the
reply is short because of the rapid propagation time for Usenet
articles."z At least one commentator has asserted that the right of
reply remedy could solve the problem of trying to apply defamation
liability standards to bulletin board operators. 93
C. "Network Defamation" Tort: A FirstAmendment Standard
If the above in-house remedies are not sufficient to address Usenet
defamation, another possible solution to the problem of Usenet
moderator liability may be to create a new tort for defamation arising
out of moderated Usenet newsgroups."9 4 This cause of action would

and Libel Litigation: Are They Compatible?, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (1986) (discussing
criticisms of the right of reply).
283. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
284. Id. at 258.
285. Id.
286. Meiklejohn, supra note 282, at 568.
287. Cavazos, supra note 118, at 244-47.
288. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
289. Id. at 369-70.
290. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
291. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
292. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
293. Cavazos, supra note 118, at 246.
294. Such a tort would not need to apply specifically to the creator of the message because
it has always been maintained that the original poster would be liable in classic defamation.
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need to balance the state interest in providing a remedy for persons who
have suffered actual injury as a result of Usenet defamation against the
goals of protecting the integrity and openness of the Internet.295 This
new tort would be largely based on a condensation of First Amendment
defamation jurisprudence, but would be narrowly tailored to apply only
to the medium of moderated newsgroups. 29
First, a network defamation cause of action would need to establish
the scope of liability in order to determine who could be sued under the
law. Arguably, the scope of potential defendants should be extremely
narrow because some moderators do not and cannot examine each
posting for defamatory content.2" For example, the moderator who'
merely assigns anonymous usemames and reposts articles under those
usemames should not be responsible for reading each message.29
Other moderators who perform merely cursory or de minimis editorial
functions should also not be liable because these groups should be
considered unmoderated.2' Thus, only moderators who perform
meaningful editorial control over the content of newsgroup articles
3
should be liable under this tort. 0 _
Such a standard comports with the judicial standards in Cubby and
Daniel. In Cubby, the court held that an on-line service could not be
held liable for defamation because it did not perform editorial functions
on the specific bulletin board.30 ' In Daniel, the court refused to hold
an electronic database liable for negligent misstatements because it was
entitled to the "fullest protection of the First Amendment. ' '3 ' The
Cubby holding implies that only network operators who exercise
editorial control over published material could be liable for defamation
published on that network or bulletin board. Additionally, under a

Charles, supra note 1, at 134-35; see Schlachter, supra note 6, at 99 (arguing the cyberspace
regulations should be based on existing legal norms).
295. Charles, supra note 1, at 145.
296. Id. at 146. One commentator has also suggested a new standard for bulletin board
operators. See id. at 147-48. This liability scheme is based upon a combination of negligence
and actual scienter requirements. Id. It punishes bulletin board operators for either knowledge
of defamatory material or failure to take certain precautions, such as posting disclaimers,
reviewing the content of messages, and maintaining a list of subscribers. Id. Given the more
amorphous nature of Usenet as compared to a local bulletin board system, this author argues that
Charles' standard should not apply to Usenet moderators.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
298. See supra Part IV.B.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.
300. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175 (describing moderators who have
meaningful editorial control).
301. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
302. Daniel, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
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traditional defamation paradigm, a newsgroup or bulletin board service
could be equated with the traditional letters-to-the-editor column of a
printed newspaper, 3" which are normally held to a publisher standard
of liability for defamation." 4 If a moderator has substantial editorial
control over the newsgroup contents, the moderator would be outside the
scope of both Cubby and Daniel. Therefore, these decisions, if extended
to Usenet moderators, potentially limit the application of defamation
liability to those moderators who exercise more than merely de minimis
editorial control.
Given that only Usenet moderators who significantly edit newsgroups
articles would be treated as primary publishers under this new network
defamation tort, a party who alleges network defamation against a
newsgroup moderator would be able to hold the moderator liable as if
the moderator originally published the defamatory article.3"5 The next
question, then, is to what standard of fault a moderator should be held.
Arguably, Usenet moderators should receive the benefits of the First
Amendment's actual malice standard when posting articles about public
figures."° Thus, a plaintiff alleging a claim of defamation against a
Usenet moderator would need to prove that a defamatory statement was
published by a moderator who either (1) knew that the statement was
defamatory or (2) acted in reckless disregard of its defamatory nature.3 7 Additionally, to recover, a plaintiff would need to plead and
prove actual damages,3 8 except when the defamation imputes one of
the common law per se categories upon the plaintiff.3"
Even when the subject of a Usenet post may not be a public figure,
Usenet moderators should still receive the protection of the First
Amendment actual malice standard. When Usenet moderators edit and
post articles to their newsgroups, they are effectively performing the
combined functions of newspapers and broadcast media." ' Although
case law has not clearly made a media/nonmedia distinction in the law
of defamation," Usenet arguably acts as a media source. Thus, Usenet

303. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200. But see Gilbert, supra note 8, at 442
(arguing against publisher standard for bulletin board operators).
305. Cf. Schlacter, supra note 6, at 116 (arguing that primary publishers have the "greatest
control," and therefore are constantly exposed to defamation liability).
306. See id. (noting that Dun & Bradstreet suggests that both media and nonmedia primary
publishers should be held to an actual malice standard).
307. See Charles, supra note 1, at 127.
308. See Perritt, supra note 11, at 101.
309. See supra text accompanying note 72.
310. Charles, supra note 1, at 146.
311. Id. at 140.
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moderators should receive the protection of the First Amendment from
' Given this scope of
defamation suits as "editors" of their "media."312
publication, the character of moderators' transmissions could qualify
them for the more stringent constitutional malice standard, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is a Usenet user.
This result adequately combines the Internet's aim to foster open and
uninhibited communications with a primary purpose of defamation
liability-the imposition of liability for speech that arguably adds little
to rational, intelligent discourse. Users should be able to express
themselves without fear of censorship. However, the imposition of the
traditional defamation paradigm also insists that users cannot always say
what they want about others, especially when the statements harm the
reputation and esteem of another person. Usenet moderators who control
the content of a newsgroup must be vigilant in weeding out defamatory
speech and should be held liable when they either know of the
defamatory character before publication or when they recklessly ignore
its content.
The requirement of pleading and proving actual economic damages
unless the speech falls under a common law category of per se
defamation is both justified and necessary. Many commentators
recognize that the electronic universe is still "unstable, unknown and
changeable."3" 3 It is unclear how defamation affects "reputation" in
cyberspace or if the measure of damages equates that of real life.14
For example, does the natural openness of the Internet allow defamed
users to combat the harmful publication with statements of their own?
Is there any difference between a user's "net-reputation" and the user's
"real life" reputation?3"5
Moreover, the determination of damages in cyberspace would be
extremely speculative. Understandably, the calculation of reputational
damages in normal defamation lawsuits also is highly speculative, a task
that requires defamation plaintiffs to call expert witnesses and other

312. See id. at 146.
313. Johnson & Marks, supra note 178, at 488.
314. See Charles, supra note 1, at 145 (claiming that reputational damage is greater in
cyberspace). However, an Australian state supreme court has found that libel can occur in
cyberspace and that the " 'publication of [libelous] remarks will make it more difficult for
[plaintiff] to obtain appropriate employment.... The damages award must compensate him...
and vindicate his reputation to the public.' " Wiener, supra note 195, at 827 (quoting West
Australian Supreme Court Justice David Ipp) (third alteration in original). One attorney, a "libel
law authority," asserted that a similar result could occur in the United States. Id.
315. Cf. Wiener, supra note 195, at 828 (suggesting that "virtual reality hasn't escaped the
bounds of real life").
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testimony to support claims of reputational injury.316 However, in
cyberspace, it is unclear whether injury can occur, much less whether
it can be measured or quantified. While the legal system relies on expert
testimony from psychologists and social behaviorists to recognize and
quantify defamation damages, it is possible that these measurement
techniques are inapplicable to cyberspace. Thus, by requiring plaintiffs
to prove actual loss to recover other damages, defendants only would
incur liability for cognizable, as opposed to highly conjectural, injury.
Furthermore, this damage requirement may prevent lawsuits against
moderators arising out of off-the-cuff but commonplace "flaming,"
which in many instances can be defamatory speech." 7 Of course, if it
could be shown that cyberspace reputation is easier to measure than in
"real life," the damage standard may need to be adjusted accordingly.
The requirement that a plaintiff plead and prove economic harm,
with the exception of specific categories of per se defamation, is a
standard borrowed from the common law of slander.3" 8 Some commentators assume that on-line defamation takes the form of libel.31 9
However, the distinction between libel and slander in cyberspace is
strained, as cyberspace entities are represented only in the ephemeral
language of electronic signals.3 ° Concepts such as "bulletin boards,"
"newsgroups," "articles," "flaming," and so forth, are merely representations of things that only exist as computer signals. 32 ' Thus, it has been
argued that defamation in the electronic medium takes the form of
slander and not libel. 3" Of course, this distinction may be inaccurate,
because the difference between libel and slander also recognizes that
slander has a lesser impact than libel, the reason why plaintiffs must
prove actual economic harm.323 On the Internet, hundreds of thousands
of users may read a defamatory newsgroup article.324 Additionally,
electronic messages can be transferred into printed form by downloading
them to a printer, and these messages may be "kept alive" by routine
316. See Wolfson, 273 So. 2d at 777-78; but see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458
So. 2d 239, 242 (Fla. 1984) (stating that a defamation plaintiff does not need to prove reputation
damage to recover).
317. See Benny Tabulujan, Beware the Info-Traps in Cyberspace, Bus. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1994, at 17; Cutrera, supra note 9, at 559-60.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
319. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 1, at 134; Cutrera, supra note 9, at 562.
320. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 562; see also supra Part II.A. (discussing the differences in
slander and libel). In fact, courts have often confused the distinction between libel and slander
in non-cyberspace. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 562.
321. Cutrera, supra note 9, at 562.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 165.
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tape backups of Usenet articles from a news server.3" However, the
common law rules of slander could be used to give defamation plaintiffs
a limited exception to the actual damages rule.3"
VII. CONCLUSION

The Internet and its related network services have initiated a
communication revolution that has just begun to impact mainstream
society.327 What was once a forum for academic and research discussion has now exploded into a new and exciting medium for more than
40 million people.3" Usenet provides a valuable Internet service as a
source of information and discussion on hundreds of topics.329 Unlike
the major on-line services, Usenet is generally free, uncensored, and
open to anyone.3" Moderators on a minority of Usenet newsgroups
help facilitate discussion by constraining the subject matter and
removing irrelevant messages.331 Thus, Usenet attempts to provide an
efficient and diverse medium for the exchange of ideas worldwide.
However, the question of moderator liability for the publication of
defamatory statements on Usenet may threaten this system of communication. Under traditional paradigms of defamation, moderators could be
as liable for defamatory statements as the original creator of the
message.332 The specter of liability would certainly deter moderated
newsgroups, as many moderators are unpaid volunteers who run
newsgroups in their spare time.333 In addition, defamation liability
could rationally extend to other network administrators. Moreover, the
extension of defamation liability runs counter to the core values of
freedom from censorship and regulation which have characterized the
Internet since its inception."3
Thus, defamation liability should not be extended to include Usenet
moderators. However, the Internet instead should and does regulate itself
to limit defamatory speech. Many Internet users know and follow
"netiquette," an unwritten set of protocols that regulate cyberspace

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Cutrera, supra note 9, at 562; Tabulujan, supra note 317, at 17.
See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
Siegel, supra note 254, at 15; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Siegel, supra note 254, at 15.
HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 158.

330. Id. at 175.
331. Wiener, supra note 195, at 827.
332. See supra Parts IV.A. & IV.B. (discussing the application of traditional defamation
liability standards to Usenet moderators).
333. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 3, at 175.
334. See supra notes 246-53 and accompanying text.
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conduct. 335 The Internet community often reacts harshly to those who
violate netiquette, especially in Usenet newsgroups. Users have also lost
network privileges for exceptional on-line abuse. Furthermore, moderated newsgroups could allow allegedly defamed users an automatic right
of reply in order to vindicate themselves on the newsgroup. However,
if defamation liability must apply to Usenet moderators, they should be
held to a First Amendment standard that requires proof of actual
malice. 36 In addition, network defamation tort plaintiffs should have
to- prove actual harm in order to recover damages, due to the highly
speculative nature of damages and reputational harm on the Internet.337
However, damages may be presumed if the speech is per se defamatory,
based upon the common law slander categories.33 In this way, liability
of network administrators and newsgroup moderators will be limited in
order to protect the freedom and openness of communication that has
characterized the Internet since its inception.

335.
336.
337.
338.

See supra notes 57, 252 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
See id.
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